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Violations of Betweenness and Choice Shifts in Groups 
1. Introduction 
Systematic violations of expected utility theory, such as the Allais (1953) paradox 
and the common ratio effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), motivated the 
development of generalized non-expected utility models (e.g., Starmer, 2000). A typical 
approach was to weaken the axioms of expected utility theory, most notably the 
independence axiom. One of the weaker versions of the independence axiom is the 
betweenness axiom (e.g., Dekel, 1986), which can be summarized as follows. A decision 
maker who chooses an alternative A over another alternative B must also choose any 
probability mixture of A and B over B itself and can never choose a probability mixture 
of A and B over A itself. In other words, if A is revealed preferred to B, then A must be 
also revealed preferred to any probability mixture of A and B and the mixture must be 
revealed preferred to B. Thus, in terms of revealed preferences, a probability mixture of 
two choice alternatives is in between the alternatives themselves, which explains the 
name of the axiom.  
The betweenness axiom can be violated in two ways. A decision maker, who 
chooses a probability mixture of A and B over alternative A as well as over alternative B, 
reveals a quasi-concave preference or a preference for randomization. A decision maker, 
who chooses alternative A as well as alternative B over a probability mixture of A and B, 
reveals a quasi-convex preference or an aversion to randomization. Early experimental 
tests of the betweenness axiom found both types of violation. Systematic quasi-concave 
preferences were documented in Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1963), Chew and 
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Waller (1986), Prelec (1990) and Blavatskyy (2013a, p.63). Systematic quasi-convex 
preferences were documented in Conlisk (1987) and Gigliotti and Sopher (1993). 
Camerer (1989) found that subjects tend to reveal quasi-concave preferences in the 
proximity of the horizontal edge of the Marschak-Machina probability triangle 
(Machina, 1982) and quasi-convex preferences in the proximity of the hypotenuse of the 
probability triangle. Note that lotteries located near the hypotenuse of the probability 
triangle are relatively risky compared to lotteries located on the same indifference curve 
but near the horizontal edge of the probability triangle. Camerer and Ho (1994) and 
Bernasconi (1994) also provide strong experimental evidence of a “squiggle” pattern of 
betweenness violations (a quasi-concave preference for a relatively safe probability 
mixture and a quasi-convex preference for, or rather aversion to, a relatively risky 
probability mixture).  
In this paper we link systematic violations of the betweenness axiom in revealed 
individual choice under uncertainty to another behavioral regularity—choice shifts in a 
group decision making3 Choice shifts are observed if an individual faces the same 
decision problem but makes a different choice when deciding alone and in a group (e.g., 
Davis et al. 1992). There are two types of choice shifts. An individual exhibits a risky shift 
when she chooses a safer alternative when deciding alone but votes for a riskier 
alternative in a group.4 An individual exhibits a cautious shift when she chooses a riskier 
alternative when deciding alone but votes for a safer alternative in a group.  
                                                     
3 Despite the fact that group decision-making is ubiquitous in social and economic life, economists have 
been a long time silent on this subject. It can be related to the literature on household behavior that 
attempts to model households as collective decision units (cf. Bourguignon and  Chiappori, 1992). 
4 A traditional explanation for a risky shift is the "diffusion of responsibility" when decisions are taken 
within a group (e.g., Wallach et al (1962, 1964)). Specifically, an individual choosing a relatively risky 
option may experience an ex post regret/guilt and this feeling is diluted within group-decision making. 
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Baker et al. (2008) and Shupp and Williams (2008) found evidence of risky shifts for 
relatively safe lotteries and cautious shifts for relatively risky lotteries. Masclet et al. 
(2009) also documented cautious shifts for relatively risky lotteries. We shall 
demonstrate that such empirical evidence is consistent with empirical evidence on 
violations of the betweenness axiom and both behavioral regularities might be the two 
sides of the same coin. 
Eliaz et al. (2006) already linked choice shifts in groups to another well-known 
behavioral regularity in individual decision making—the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953).  
Eliaz et al. (2006, p.1322, footnote 4) note that preferences that are consistent with 
choice shifts must violate the betweenness axiom. Eliaz et al. (2006) consider one 
prominent family of such preferences—those represented by rank-dependent utility 
with a concave probability weighting function (e.g., Abdellaoui, 2002). In this 
framework, an individual exhibits the Allais paradox if and only if she reveals a specific 
pattern of choice shifts in groups (Theorem 1 in Eliaz et al., 2006). 
In this paper we show that an individual exhibits choice shifts in group decision 
making if and only if she violates the betweenness axiom, that is, as already mentioned 
above, a weaker version of the independence axiom. Our result generalizes the result of 
Eliaz et al. (2006) since we do not restrict our analysis to a specific class of preferences. 
If preferences are not represented by rank-dependent utility, Theorem 1 in Eliaz et al. 
(2006) does not apply, i.e. an individual, who exhibits the Allais paradox, may not 
necessarily violate the betweenness axiom (e.g., Chew, 1983) and therefore she may 
exhibit no choice shift. For example, if individual preferences are captured by a 
disappointment aversion theory, a decision maker may exhibit the Allais paradox 
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without violating the betweenness axiom. Thus, such an individual exhibits no choice 
shifts. 
Unlike Eliaz et al. (2006), we do not assume rank-dependent utility representation 
of preference in this paper. Yet, our results are consistent with a rank-dependent utility 
representation with an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function. It is worthwhile 
to note that an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function is strongly supported by 
empirical evidence, e.g., Wu and Gonzalez (1996), Wakker (2010). In contrast, Eliaz et 
al. (2006) considered only rank-dependent utility with a concave probability weighting 
function. Such an assumption about the probability weighting function is arguably less 
descriptively accurate (see, however, Blavatskyy (2013)). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the first 
behavioral regularity—violations of the betweenness axiom in individual choice under 
uncertainty. Section 3 defines the second behavioral regularity—choice shifts in a group 
decision making. Section 4 presents our main result linking the two regularities. Section 
5 concludes with a general discussion. 
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2. Violations of the Betweenness Axiom 
Let 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] denote a probability mixture of a relatively safer lottery 𝒔 and 
a relatively riskier lottery 𝒓 for some mixing probability 𝑝 ∊ (0,1). The literature 
documenting violations of the betweenness axiom can then be summarized as follows. 
People tend to choose a mixture 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] over lottery 𝒔 as well as lottery 𝒓  
when probability 𝑝 is close to one.  People tend to choose lottery 𝒔 as well as lottery 𝒓 
over a mixture 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] when probability 𝑝 is close to zero. This pattern can 
be generated by several prominent non-expected utility theories such as, for example, 
rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1981) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992) with inverse S-shaped probability weighting function (cf. Figure 1). 
Blavatskyy (2006) shows that betweenness violations can be an artifact of random errors 
(even when an individual maximizes expected utility). 
 
Figure 1: Utility of mixture 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓]  as a function of probability p 
according to rank-dependent utility theory with probability weighting function 
w(p)=pγ/(pγ+(1-p)γ)1/γ, γ=0.61 (a median estimate in Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
Lottery 𝒓 yields outcome 𝑥, 𝑢(𝑥) = 1, with probability 0.8 and zero otherwise (𝑢(0) =
0). Lottery 𝒔 yields outcome y, u(y)=w(0.8)/w(0.95)=0.766, with probability 0.95 and 
zero otherwise. 
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We consider a “squiggle” pattern of betweenness violations: there exist a 
probability ?̅? ∈ [0, 1] such that an individual has strictly quasi-concave preferences over 
probability mixtures 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] when 𝑝 > ?̅? and strictly quasi-convex 
preferences—when 𝑝 < ?̅?. This is formalized in the following Assumption 1 (as usual, 
preference relation 𝒔 ≽ 𝒓 denotes that lottery 𝒔 is chosen over lottery 𝒓, the symmetric 
part of ≽ is denoted by ∼ and the asymmetric part of ≽ is denoted by ≻).  In the 
following and through the paper we assume rational and continuous preferences. 
Assumption 1 An individual violates betweenness if there are two lotteries s and r as well 
as a probability ?̅? ∈ [0, 1] such that 𝒔 ∼ 𝒓 ∼  ?̅?[𝒔] + (1 − ?̅?)[𝒓] and 
a) the individual has strictly quasi-concave preferences over mixtures 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] 
when 𝑝 ≥ ?̅?, i.e., for all  ?̅? ≤ 𝛼 < 𝛽 < 𝛾 ≤ 1, mixture 𝛽[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛽)[𝒓] is strictly 
preferred over the worst of 𝛼[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛼)[𝒓] and 𝛾[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛾)[𝒓]; 
b) the individual has strictly quasi-convex preferences over mixtures 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] 
when 𝑝 ≤ ?̅?, i.e., for all  for 0 ≤ 𝛼 < 𝛽 < 𝛾 ≤ ?̅?, the best of 𝛼[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛼)[𝒓] and  
𝛾[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛾)[𝒓] is strictly preferred over mixture 𝛽[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛽)[𝒓] 
Probability ?̅? denotes the crossing point: an individual chooses lottery 𝒓 as well as 
lottery  𝒔 over a mixture 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] when  𝑝 is below the threshold ?̅? and she 
chooses the mixture over lottery 𝒓 as well as lottery 𝒔 when 𝑝 is above the threshold  ?̅?. 
Eliaz et al. (2006) considered only quasi-convex preferences, i.e. they allowed for 
betweenness violations when ?̅? = 1. We generalize the analysis of Eliaz et al. (2006) and 
allow for the violations of the betweenness axiom when ?̅? ≤ 1. 
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3. Choice Shifts 
Stoner (1961) was the first study to document risky shifts—a group tends to choose 
a riskier option compared to the individual choices of the group’s members in isolation.  
Subsequently, several studies also documented cautious shifts—a group tends to 
choose a safer option compared to the individual choices of the group’s members in 
isolation (e.g., Nordhoy (1962), Stoner (1968)). Bateman and Munro (2005) found that 
groups make consistently more risk averse choices than individual members of the 
group and mentioned anecdotal evidence from their subjects that fear of 
“recrimination” made the subjects reluctant to choose risky options within a group. 
Rockenbach et al. (2007) found that groups were significantly less risk taking than 
independent individuals (i.e. not members of the group). Shupp and Williams (2008) 
found that groups were significantly more risk averse than individual members of the 
group as well as independent individuals in the higher-risk lotteries. Shupp and Williams 
(2008) found that groups were less risk averse than independent individuals (but not 
individual members of the group) in the lower-risk lotteries.  
On the other hand, Bone et al. (1999) found that groups reveal the common ratio 
effect to a similar extent as individuals. Harrison et al. (2012) found no evidence that 
subjects systematically reveal different risk attitudes in a group (with no prior 
knowledge about the risk preferences of others) compared to individual decisions. Kerr 
et al. (1996) provide an extensive review of the literature in social psychology on 
differences in groups and individual decision making. To sum up, no clear consensus has 
been reached in the literature: although group shifts appear to be a consistent and 
robust phenomenon, both risky and cautious shifts have been identified in the literature 
(cf. Davis et al. (1992) for a discussion). 
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When voting between a safe lottery 𝒔 and a risky lottery 𝒓 in a group an individual 
de facto chooses between two compound lotteries 𝒓∗and 𝒔∗: 
𝒓∗ = 𝑎 [𝒓] + (1 − 𝑎)[𝑏[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑏)[𝒓]] 
𝒔∗ = 𝑎 [𝒔] + (1 − 𝑎)[𝑏[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑏)[𝒓]], 
where 𝑎 ∈ (0, 1) is the probability that an individual is pivotal (an outcome depends on 
her decision) and  𝑏 ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the group choses 𝒔  when an 
individual is not pivotal. This framework allows us to capture various possible voting 
rules. For instance, when a unanimous vote is required to replace s with r then b=1; 
when a unanimous vote is required to replace r with s then b=0. 
Definition 1 A decision maker reveals a risky shift when 𝒔 ∼ 𝒓 and  𝒓∗ ≻ 𝒔∗; a decision 
maker reveals a cautious shift when 𝒔 ∼ 𝒓 and  𝒔∗ ≻ 𝒓∗. 
Lotteries 𝐫∗ and 𝐬∗ can be simplifies as follows: 
𝒓∗ = 𝑝𝑟[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝𝑟)[𝒓] 
𝒔∗ = 𝑝𝑠[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝𝑠)[𝒓] 
where 𝑝𝑟 = (1 − 𝑎)𝑏 and 𝑝𝑠 = (1 − 𝑎)𝑏 + 𝑎. Thus, both lotteries 𝐫
∗ and 𝐬∗ are 
probability mixtures of lotteries 𝒓 and 𝒔. An individual, who respects the betweenness 
axiom, chooses between probability mixtures 𝐫∗ and 𝐬∗  in the same manner as she 
chooses between lotteries 𝒓 and 𝒔. Yet, a revealed preference between probability 
mixtures 𝐫∗ and 𝐬∗  may differ from a revealed preference between lotteries 𝒓 and 𝒔 
when an individual violated the betweenness axiom. Thus, choice shifts are linked to the 
violations of betweenness and the next theorem formally characterizes this relationship. 
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4. Main Result 
Theorem 1 The following two statements are equivalent: 
1) A decision maker violates the betweenness axiom; 
2) There exist 𝑏1(𝑎), 𝑏2(𝑎) ∊ [0,1], 𝑏2(𝑎) > 𝑏1(𝑎) such that for all 𝑎 ∈ (0, 1) 
a) an individual exhibits a risky shift when either  
i. 𝑎 ≤ ?̅? and 𝑏 < 𝑏1(𝑎) or  
ii. 𝑎 ≤ 1 − ?̅?  and 𝑏 > 𝑏2(𝑎);  
b) an individual exhibits a cautious shift when either   
i. ?̅? ≥ 𝑎 >  1 − ?̅? and 𝑏 > 𝑏1(𝑎), or 
ii. ?̅? < 𝑎 ≤ 1 − ?̅?  and 𝑏 < 𝑏2(𝑎);  
iii. 𝑎 ≤ min {?̅?,   1 − ?̅?} and  𝑏1(𝑎) < 𝑏 < 𝑏2(𝑎)  
iv. 𝑎 > max {?̅?,   1 − ?̅?} 
Proof is presented in the Appendix.  
Whether an individual exhibits a risky or a cautious shift depends on her expectation 
to be pivotal (probability a) and her expectation how the group chooses when she is not 
pivotal (probability b). For example, when an individual has high expectations to be 
pivotal, i.e. when 𝑎 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{?̅?, 1 − ?̅?}, then she always reveals a cautious shift. Also, 
when an individual is not quite sure how the group will chose when she is not pivotal, 
i.e. when b1<b<b2, then she always reveals a cautious shift. On the other hand, when an 
individual has low expectations to be pivotal, she may reveal a risky shift or a cautious 
shift (depending on her expectations how the group chooses when she is not pivotal). 
Eliaz et al. (2006) considered only quasi-convex preferences, i.e., when the crossing 
probability ?̅? = 1. In this case, probability a always satisfies condition 𝑎 < ?̅? = 1 and it 
- 11 -  
 
can never satisfy condition 𝑎 < 1 − ?̅? = 0. Theorem 1 then implies that an individual 
exhibits a risky shift when 𝑏 < 𝑏1 and a cautious shift when 𝑏 > 𝑏1, for some threshold 
𝑏1 ∊ [0,1]. This corresponds to the main result of Eliaz et al. (2006, p. 1324, Theorem 1).  
For an individual with quasi-concave preferences the crossing probability is ?̅? = 0. 
In this case, probability a always satisfies condition 𝑎 < 1 − ?̅? = 1 and it can never 
satisfy condition 𝑎 < ?̅? = 0. Theorem 1 then implies that an individual exhibits a risky 
shift when 𝑏 > 𝑏2 and a cautious shift when 𝑏 < 𝑏2, for some threshold 𝑏2 ∊ [0,1]. 
Consider an example when a unanimity vote is required to change the status quo. 
In this case probability a is simply the probability that all other group members chose 
the same lottery (otherwise there is already a disagreement among other group 
members and a unanimity vote cannot be achieved no matter what our individual 
decides). It is easy to see that  𝑏 = 1 when the status quo is a safer lottery 𝒔 and 𝑏 = 0 
when the status quo is a riskier lottery 𝒓. Eliaz et al. (2006, p. 1326) show that a choice 
shift to the status quo occurs for all values of probability 𝑎 (under the assumption of 
quasi-convex preferences). In our setup, the decision to revert to the status quo depends 
on the value of probability 𝑎.  
Consider the case when the status quo is lottery 𝒔 (𝑏 = 1). According to Theorem 
1, an individual reveals a risky shift (away from the status quo) if probability 𝑎 is low 
enough, i.e. 𝑎 < 1 − ?̅?. An individual, who is indifferent between lotteries 𝒓 and 𝒔 when 
choosing alone, may prefer to vote for a risky lottery 𝒓 in a group if she believes that the 
chance of her being pivotal is rather low. The intuition is similar to the pseudo-
endowment effect (Prelec, 1990).  
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Now consider the case when the status quo is lottery 𝒓 (𝑏 = 0). According to 
Theorem 1, an individual reveals a cautious shift (away from the status quo) if probability 
𝑎 is high enough, i.e. 𝑎 > ?̅?. Intuitively, when 𝑏 = 0 and an individual decides to vote 
for a safer lottery in a group, she effectively faces a compound lottery 𝒔∗ = 𝑎 [𝒔] +
(1 − 𝑎)[𝒓]. For high values of probability 𝑎  this compound lottery lies in the 
neighborhood of 𝒔. Since an individual has quasi-concave preferences in the 
neighborhood of 𝒔, she prefers compound lottery 𝒔∗ = 𝑎 [𝒔] + (1 − 𝑎)[𝒓] over 𝒓∗ = 𝒓 
. In other words, a cautious shift (away from the status quo) is observed. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper offers a new decision-theoretical explanation why decisions made in a 
group may differ from decisions taken alone even when the decision problem is the 
same. When deciding in a group, a decision maker faces compound lotteries that are 
probability mixtures of simple lotteries that she faces in individual choice. Under 
standard microeconomic assumption (the betweenness axiom) preferences over 
compound lotteries should be consistent with those over simple lotteries. Yet, empirical 
evidence strongly suggests that the betweenness axiom is often violated. In such a case, 
the preferences revealed over compound lotteries may not correspond to the 
preferences revealed over simple lotteries, i.e. an individual may exhibit a choice shift. 
This paper shows that a typical, so-called “squiggle”, pattern of betweenness violations 
implies a specific pattern of choice shifts: an individual exhibits a risky shift when her 
expectation to be pivotal is sufficiently low and her expectation how the group will 
decide when she is not pivotal is sufficiently close to zero or one. On the other hand, an 
individual exhibits a cautious shift when she has a high expectation to be pivotal. 
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Theoretical results presented in this paper have several testable implications. For 
instance, if a household is viewed as a small group where each member of the household 
has a relatively high chance to be pivotal, then individual members of the household 
exhibit a cautious shift, which can be reflected in a relatively low investment on the stock 
market. Thus, our decision-theoretical explanation of choice shifts predicts a lower 
investment on the stock market of households composed of several individuals 
compared to households composed of only one individual. In other words, an equity 
premium puzzle on the household level can be a consequence of the fact that individual 
members of the household violate expected utility theory (and, in particular, the 
betweenness axiom). 
Our main result (theorem 1) can be also applied to decision making within a large 
committee/jury where each member has a relatively low chance to be pivotal. In this 
case, individual members exhibit a risky shift when the positions of other members are 
already known and a cautious shift—when the positions of other members are not really 
known. 
A natural extension of our work is to consider an equilibrium model of choice shifts. 
Given a specific voting rule and the distribution of risk preferences, we can construct 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. However, the existence of Nash equilibrium crucially 
depends on the assumption of quasi-concavity of preferences (e.g., Crawford, 1990) and 
it may not be satisfied when decision makers exhibit “squiggle” pattern of betweenness 
violations. In such a case the notion of equilibrium in beliefs as proposed by Crawford 
(1990) could be applied. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1:  We prove first that part 1 of the theorem implies part 2. 
Notice that 𝑝𝑠 = (1 − 𝑎)𝑏 + 𝑎 > (1 − 𝑎)𝑏 = 𝑝𝑟. Since ?̅?[𝒔] + (1 − ?̅?)[𝒓] ∼ 𝒔 then 
by setting 𝛼 = ?̅?, 𝛽 = 𝑝 and 𝛾 = 1 in part a) of Assumption 1 we immediately obtain 
that mixture 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] is strictly preferred over 𝒔  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝 ∊ (?̅?, 1). Since 
?̅?[𝒔] + (1 − ?̅?)[𝒓] ∼ 𝒓 then part b) of Assumption 1 implies that 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] ≺
𝒓 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝 ∊ (0, ?̅?). Thus, if 𝑝𝑠 > ?̅? > 𝑝𝑟 then we must have 𝒔
∗ ≻ 𝒔 ∼ 𝒓 ≻ 𝒓∗ and an 
individual exhibits a cautious shift. This evidences proves statement b) iv. Therefore, an 
individual can exhibit a risky shift only in two cases: either when ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑠 > 𝑝𝑟 or when  
𝑝𝑠 > 𝑝𝑟 ≥ ?̅?. 
Consider first the case when  ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑠 > 𝑝𝑟. Since 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝑟 + 𝑎  then this case is only 
possible when 𝑎 ≤ ?̅?. According to part b) of Assumption 1, an individual has strictly 
quasi-convex preferences on the interval [0, ?̅?] i.e., for all  for 0 ≤ 𝛼 < 𝛽 < 𝛾 ≤ ?̅?, the 
best of 𝛼[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛼)[𝒓] and  𝛾[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛾)[𝒓] is strictly preferred over mixture 
𝛽[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛽)[𝒓]. Quasi-convexity implies that the set 𝐿 = {𝑝 ∈ [0, ?̅?]: 𝑠∗ ≽ 𝑝[𝑠] +
(1 − 𝑝)[𝑟]} is convex, i.e. an interval. Moreover, since 𝒔∗ ≽ 𝒔∗  then this interval L must 
contain probability 𝑝𝑠. More specifically, interval L must be of the form either [𝑐, 𝑝𝑠] or 
[𝑝𝑠, 𝑐] for some threshold 𝑐 ∊ [0, ?̅?). An individual then exhibits a risky shift 𝒓
∗ ≻ 𝒔∗ if 
and only if 𝑝𝑟 ∊ [0, 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑐, 𝑝𝑠}]\𝐿, which is an interval of the form [0, 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑐, 𝑝𝑠}), for 
some threshold 𝑐 ∊ [0, ?̅?). Thus, an individual exhibits a risky shift when 𝑎 ≤ ?̅? and  𝑝𝑟 <
𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑐, 𝑝𝑠}. The latter inequality can be rewritten as 𝑝𝑟 = (1 − 𝑎)𝑏 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑐, 𝑝𝑠}  or  
𝑏 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑐, 𝑝𝑠}/(1 − 𝑎) ≡ 𝑏1(𝑎).  This evidence proves part a) i. and b) i. of the 
theorem. 
Now consider the second case when  𝑝𝑠 > 𝑝𝑟 ≥ ?̅?.  Since 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝑟 + 𝑎  then this case 
is only possible when 𝑎 ≤ 1 − ?̅?. According to part a) of Assumption 1, an individual has 
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strictly quasi-concave preferences on the interval  [?̅?, 1], i.e., for all  ?̅? ≤ 𝛼 < 𝛽 < 𝛾 ≤
1, mixture 𝛽[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛽)[𝒓] is strictly preferred over the worst of 𝛼[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛼)[𝒓] 
and 𝛾[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛾)[𝒓]. Quasi-concavity implies that the set 𝑈 = {𝑝 ∈ [?̅?, 1]: 𝑝[𝑠] +
(1 − 𝑝)[𝑟] ≽ 𝑟∗} is convex, i.e. an interval. Since 𝒓∗ ≽ 𝒓∗  then this interval U must 
contain probability 𝑝𝑟. More specifically, interval U must be of the form either [ 𝑝𝑟 , 𝑑] 
or [𝑑, 𝑝𝑟] for some threshold 𝑑 ∊ [?̅?, 1]. An individual then exhibits a risky shift 𝒓
∗ ≻ 𝒔∗ 
if and only if 𝑝𝑠 ∊ [ 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑑, 𝑝𝑟},1]\𝑈, which is an interval of the form (𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑑, 𝑝𝑟},1], for 
some threshold 𝑑 ∊ [?̅?, 1]. Thus, an individual exhibits a risky shift if 𝑎 ≤ 1 − ?̅?  and  
𝑝𝑠 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑑, 𝑝𝑟}. The latter inequality can be rewritten as  𝑝𝑠 = (1 − 𝑎)𝑏 + 𝑎 >
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑑, 𝑝𝑟}  or  𝑏 > (𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑑, 𝑝𝑟} − 𝑎)/(1 − 𝑎) ≡ 𝑏2(𝑎). This evidence proves part a) ii. 
and b) ii. of the theorem.  
To finish the proof that part 1 implies part 2 we need to show that  𝑏2(𝑎) > 𝑏1(𝑎). 
Fix a value of 𝑎 s.t. 𝑎 < ?̅? and 𝑎 < 1 − ?̅?.  First note that  𝑟∗~𝑠∗  can happen only in two 
cases: ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑠 > 𝑝𝑟 and 𝑝𝑠 > 𝑝𝑟 ≥ ?̅? . When ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑠 > 𝑝𝑟 we observe the risk shift only 
for all 𝑏 < 𝑏1(𝑎) and for 𝑏 = 𝑏1(𝑎) we have that 𝑟
∗~𝑠∗ . Note that in this case we have 
𝑝𝑟 = (1 − 𝑎)𝑏1(𝑎) so that inequality ?̅? > 𝑝𝑟 can be rewritten as 
?̅? > (1 − 𝑎)𝑏1(𝑎) 
When 𝑝𝑠 > 𝑝𝑟 > ?̅? we observe the risk shift only for all 𝑏 > 𝑏2(𝑎) and for 𝑏 =
𝑏2(𝑎) we have that 𝑟
∗~𝑠∗ . Note that in this case we have 𝑝𝑟 = (1 − 𝑎)𝑏2(𝑎) so that 
inequality 𝑝𝑟 > ?̅?  can be rewritten as 
(1 − 𝑎)𝑏2(𝑎) > ?̅? 
Inequalities (1) and (2) can hold simultaneously only if 𝑏2(𝑎) > 𝑏1(𝑎). Finally we 
have to consider the cases in which either 𝑎 ≤ ?̅? or 𝑎 ≤ 1 − ?̅? or both are not satisfied.  
Note that  𝑎 ≤ ?̅? implies  0 < 𝑏1(𝑎) < 1 and 𝑎 ≤ 1 − ?̅? implies 0 < 𝑏2(𝑎) < 1. Suppose 
that 𝑎 ≥ ?̅?  in this case 𝑏1(𝑎) = 0. Suppose that 𝑎 ≥ 1 − ?̅?  in this case 𝑏2(𝑎) = 1.  Then 
(1) 
(2) 
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𝑏2(𝑎) > 𝑏1(𝑎) holds for all possible values of  𝑎. This evidence together with the 
previous ones proves  b) iii. of the theorem. 
Now we prove that part 2 of the theorem implies part 1.  
We claim that the part 2 of the theorem implies  𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] ≻ 𝒓 ∀𝑝 ∈ (?̅?, 1) and 
𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓] ≺ 𝒓 ∀𝑝 ∈ (0, ?̅?). Consider an individual who is indifferent between 𝒔 
and 𝒓. Assume ?̅? < 𝑎 < 1. In this case, when 𝑏 = 0, part 2 of the theorem implies a 
cautious shift, i.e. 𝒔∗ ≻ 𝒓∗, ∀𝑎 ∈ (?̅?, 1). Note that for  𝑏 = 0, 𝒓∗ = 𝒓. By contradiction, 
suppose that there exists a value 𝑝∗ ∊ (?̅?, 1) such that 𝑝∗[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝∗)[𝒓] ≼ 𝒓 and 
𝑝∗[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝∗)[𝒓] ≼ 𝒔. Suppose 𝑏 = 0 and 𝑎 = 𝑝∗ > ?̅?. In such a case 𝒓∗ = [𝒓] and 
𝒔∗ = 𝑝∗[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝∗)[𝒓].  By initial assumption we have then 𝒓∗ ≽ 𝒔∗, which 
contradicts part 2 of the theorem, that in such case states  𝒔∗ ≻ 𝒓∗. 
Assume 1 − ?̅? < 𝑎 < 1. In this case, when 𝑏 = 1, part 2 of the theorem implies a 
cautious shift, i.e. 𝒔∗ ≻ 𝒓∗, ∀𝑎 ∈ (1 − ?̅?, 1). Note that for  𝑏 = 1, 𝒔∗ = 𝒔. By 
contradiction, suppose that there exists a value 𝑝∗ ∊ (0, ?̅?) such that 𝑝∗[𝒔] +
(1 − 𝑝∗)[𝒓] ≽ 𝒓 and 𝑝∗[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝∗)[𝒓] ≽ 𝒔. Suppose 𝑏 = 1 and 𝑎 = 1 − 𝑝∗ > 1 − ?̅?. 
In such a case 𝒔∗ = [𝒔] and 𝒓∗ = 𝑝∗[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝∗)[𝒓]. By initial assumption we have 
then 𝒓∗ ≽ 𝒔∗, which contradicts part 2 of the theorem, that in such case states  𝒔∗ ≻ 𝒓∗. 
The evidences above  prove our claim. 
Now we claim that the theorem implies the existence of  ?̅? ∈ [0, 1] such that 𝒔 ∼ 𝒓 ∼
 ?̅?[𝒔] + (1 − ?̅?)[𝒓]. Assume an individual who is indifferent between 𝒔 and 𝒓. Consider 
the set 𝑈 = {𝑝[𝑠] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝑟]: 𝑝[𝑠] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝑟] ≽ 𝒓}. Using the above 
considerations for ?̅? < 𝑎 < 1 we can state that this set is closed only if lottery ?̅?[𝑠] +
(1 − ?̅?)[𝑟] ≽ 𝒓. Consider the set of 𝐿 = {𝑝[𝑠] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝑟]: 𝒔 ≽ 𝑝[𝑠] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝑟]}. 
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Using the above considerations for 1 − ?̅? < 𝑎 < 1 we can state that this set is closed 
only if lottery 𝒔 ≽ ?̅?[𝑠] + (1 − ?̅?)[𝑟].  Continuity of preferences implies that sets 𝐿 and 
𝑈 are closed that happen only if 𝑠 ∼ 𝑟 ∼  ?̅?[𝑠] + (1 − ?̅?)[𝑟]. 
Now we show that statement part 2 of the theorem implies that preferences are quasi-
concave for 𝑝 > ?̅? and quasi-convex for 𝑝 < ?̅?. By definition of quasi-concavity 
preferences are strictly quasi-concave for 𝑝 ∈ [?̅?, 1] if and only if are single-peaked on 
this interval.  Suppose preferences are not quasi-concave for 𝑝 > ?̅? i.e. there exist 
probabilities 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ [?̅?, 1], 𝑝 ≠ 𝑞, such that 𝑝[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝒓]~𝑞[𝒔] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝒓] and 
for some 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) (𝛼 ∙ 𝑝 + (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑞)[𝒔] + (1 − 𝛼 ∙ 𝑝 − (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑞)[𝒓] ≼ 𝑝[𝒔] +
(1 − 𝑝)[𝒓]. It follows that preferences are not single peaked in 𝑝 ∈ [?̅?, 1] and therefore 
there are either 1) at least two separated intervals on 𝑝 where is possible to find a value 
of 𝑎 < 1 − ?̅? such that 𝑠∗ ≻ 𝑟∗ or 2) an interval on 𝑝 where is possible to find a value of 
𝑎 < 1 − ?̅? such that 𝑠∗ ∼ 𝑟∗.  In both case a violation of the part 2 of the theorem. 
Using the similar arguments we can prove that part 2 of the theorem implies strictly 
quasi-convex preferences for 𝑝 < ?̅?. 
QED. 
